This article looks at the challenges faced by Macedonia in creating a national identity since independence. After briefly reviewing the region's history since the 7 th century, the revolt for independence at the end of the 19 th century, the interwar period when it was part of Serbia, and the Yugoslav era when Macedonia first attained a separate political existence, the article addresses the challenges the Slav Macedonians faced in creating an identity for the new state. Some of those challenges came from Serbia and Bulgaria, which claimed that the Macedonian Slavs were actually part of their respective nations, and from Greece, which objected to the symbols and the name they had adopted. The greatest resistance inside Macedonia to an exclusively Slavic national identity, however, came from the Albanian community, located mainly in the eastern reaches of the country and in Skopje. An unwillingness to share power or to make concessions by the Slav nationalists eventually resulted in armed insurrection by the Albanians in 2001. Though the Ohrid Accords signed the same year ended the fighting, tension between the two communities has continued on and off until the present, despite some examples of peaceful coexistence.
people besides the Serbs. Until the 1880s, the struggle over Macedonia was basically one between "Bulgarism" and "Hellenism." 14 That was the beginning of the so-called problem of the Balkans and that of Macedonia, of which it was a part. The dilemma that faced the states of Europe with the "Macedonian Question" was how to divide the territory among the three neighboring states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. 15 That challenge, or "question" as it was normally phrased, had its origins in the Congress of Berlin in 1880. As Kaplan points out "the 'Eastern Question' that finally boiled over in 1914 was largely an early packaging of the 'Macedonian Question,'…." 16 It had wide-ranging consequences that went far beyond the region itself. Kaplan goes on to state that, "Macedonia was to become the original seedground not only of modern warfare and political conflict, but of modern terrorism and clerical fanaticism as well." The Macedonian question, which so terrorized southern Europe in the first fourteen years of this century, comprises two elements which paradoxically run parallel and concurrently. The first element comprises the various perceptions of Macedonia's neighbors. Except for the most extreme nationalists, Serbs have, by and large, come to accept the Titoist solution which afforded recognition of the Macedonian nation, with the boundaries of Vardar Macedonia, roughly corresponding to the republic's present borders. Some political currents in Serbia still maintain Vardar Macedonia is southern Serbia, as the territory was officially known in the inter-war years. To the east, Bulgaria has recognized the Republic of Macedonia as an independent state but still refuses to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian nation. Greeks show the least willingness to compromise of all-neither the Macedonian nation, nor a Republic of Macedonia can exist because Greece has exclusive historical and territorial rights over Macedonia. These attitudes, which range from grudging tolerance to a hostile campaign directed against the Macedonian state, are leading to the suffocation of this small but vital square of territory which provides a land crossing east and west and north and south, across the Balkan mountains.
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The claims made on Macedonia by Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece led to the Balkans wars of 1912. 23 At the end of those in 1913 Macedonia was finally divided between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, a situation that endured until the Second World War. After the First World War, it groups proliferated in the area during this period. Aside from IMRO there was also the Bulgarian-MacedonianAdrianople Revolutionary Organization (BMARO) and the Secret Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization (SMARO). 20 Kaplan, p. 57 . 21 Danforth, p. 28. 33 Slovenia had only a brief conflict with the Serb-dominated central Yugoslav government before being allowed to depart the federation. 34 But Albanians only constituted 3% at the national university, and the government forbade the creation of an Albanian university in Tetovo saying it could not do so for every minority. It also feared that such an institution would become a "political training ground for separatists." Raymond Bonner, "In Macedonia, New Fears of a Wider Balkan War," 9 April 1995.
respective branches of the Slavic tree. The Greeks' contention was not related to people as much as to symbols. They claimed that the very name "Macedonia" was one of its cultural possessions and they did not recognize the Macedonians' right to use it as the name for their new country.
Aside from that, they argued that there was already a Greek province by the name of Macedonia just across the border. George Papavizas, like many other Greeks, maintained that it was the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia that had "created" Macedonia and the concept of the Macedonian Slavs.
35
Greece's objections had still other repercussions for the Macedonians. They prevented
Macedonia from breaking out of its isolation and becoming a member of European and international organizations. Writing in 1991 Glenny explained that:
Although Macedonia has disengaged itself from the Yugoslav federation without blood being shed, it has…yet to win recognition from the European Community or the United States because of Greece's hysterical objection to Macedonian statehood. The creation of such a state, the Greeks say, is an affront to the tradition of Hellenic Macedonia and it implies a plan of territorial expansion.
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Greece vetoed Macedonia's application for membership to NATO in 2008 and rejected the use of the name Macedonia because "the use of the term implies a claim to Greek territory with the same name." 37 The Greek view was that "indigenous Hellenic Macedonians (IHMs)" living in
Greece were "the only people who can be called Macedonians."
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As a consequence of that on-going dispute, Greece closed its port of Salonika to Vasili Neofotistos remarked that that was a way "for Macedonia to affirm its national existence,"
and that by doing so Macedonia wanted "to advance the thesis that it is a cornerstone of Western civilization." 40 The Greek foreign minister told deputies in the Parliament that "the statue was a major point of foreign policy." He called it "a provocation" that fueled "irredentism, the greatest threat to the Balkans." 41 Though it had an unemployment rate of 31 percent and the cost of $13 million to erect the statue of Alexander was considerable, the Macedonians considered it worthwhile. The statue was not the only structure to be given the name of that famous historical figure. The airport in Skopje, a highway, and a stadium were bestowed with Alexander's name as well. In 2011, the two countries were "still negotiating a new name" and they had given indications that "they might consider a geographical modifier of Macedonia," such as "Northern Macedonia," which Greece favored, or "Macedonia (Skopje)," which the Macedonians favored.
Nonetheless, Macedonia filed suit in the International Court of Justice because of Greece's action and accused it of violating the 1995 agreement.
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The United States' decision to support Greece's "harsh demands" invited "claims on
Macedonia from outside and a disintegration from within." The Greeks considered the use of the name "Macedonia" as "part of a plot to grab the glory that was Greece, and some of its territory as well." Athens wanted it to use the name "Republic of Skopje." The Greeks argued that The minority community that presented the greatest challenge to the vision of a Macedonia that had a Slavic identity and was defined by Slavic culture and language was that of the Albanians. The Albanians comprise approximately twenty-five per cent of the country's population. 49 They are concentrated for the most part in the western portions of the country.
They were a majority of the population in many areas including the cities of Tetovo, Gostivar, Kiçevo, and Debar, and in the capital Skopje they constituted 14% of the population. 50 The
Albanians also differed from the Macedonian Slavs with respect to religion. Although there was a minority of Albanians who were Christians, the vast majority are Moslems. At the same time, the population of the region of Kosovo to the north is ninety-percent Albanian.
Not only was there a large Albanian population within Macedonia and all along its borders in the west, but the size of the community had been increasing rapidly for decades. Poulton, especially those of the Turks and the Gypsies, there was the perceived "Albanianization" of those two groups. 63 In 1989, the government in Skopje changed the republic's definition from "a state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities," to a "nation-state of Macedonian people" because of the unease caused by Albanian nationalism. 64 Despite attempts to resolve the many problems that existed between the two communities, they remained as far apart as ever. As Poulton commented of the relationship between Macedonia's two major communities, "The reality of the situation in Macedonia is that there is very little mixing between ethnic groups." 65 minority group, the Albanians, full rights-to education, to recognition of their language, [and] to jobs in the civil service." For ten years Albanians had "pushed for greater rights…with little success." The Slavs were "willing to share-but not to the point of giving up what they believed makes them Macedonians, that is, their own language and culture." The Slavs also maintained that the Albanians' demands were "a veneer for another agenda" which was "to carve from Macedonia a new, separate state for Albanians." The Albanians denied that, but the proximity of Kosovo and Albania to western Macedonia nevertheless made it a sensitive issue.
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After eight months of fighting and the death of perhaps two hundred persons, the conflict eventually came to an end when international envoys brokered a peace agreement termed the Ohrid Accords, which took its name from the picturesque city in the southwest of the country.
According to its terms the Albanian insurrectionists agreed to give up their arms in exchange for amnesty and the government's promise to improve rights for minorities. Although "the agreement encouraged Albanians to integrate politically," it left "a societal chasm" between the two communities.
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There was an expectation that elections that were to be held in the fall of 2002 would be marred by violence. 74 That did not occur, however. Moreover, the election's results were decisive. The two Slav and Albanian parties that composed the ruling coalition were defeated at the polls and replaced by the Social Democrats, a moderate left Slavic party, and the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI), the Albanian party led by Ali Ahmeti, the former leader of the rebellion that had occurred in the west of the country. But the country's "ethnic divide" Samson noted was "as entrenched as ever." The Social Democrats then had to decide "whether to share power" with the BDI, "the new dominant force in Albanian politics." 75 One cause for optimism, however, occurred when a group of Slavs joined Ahmeti's BDI believing that it offered a better alternative for solving the country's ethnic problems. minorities, which made up more than twenty-percent of the local population, also had "the right to address their local council in their own languages," a policy that would "benefit Albanians, as well as other minorities such as Turks."
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Many Macedonian Slavs, however, considered those changes "ethnic gerrymandering."
They particularly objected to "the attachment of outlying Albanian villages to the capital, Skopje, and Struga." That would increase the number of Albanians in both cities and make them a majority in Struga. The officials of the city, most of whom were Slavs, also complained that the government had not consulted them beforehand. One official stated that the city would be unable to "function properly" if that occurred and that the change would involve "people with different cultures and mentalities." Finally, the city's mayor considered the changes a "threat to its peaceful existence."
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The Slavic nationalist organization The World Macedonian Congress, which was in favor of the referendum, maintained that the changes would "force members of the ethnic majority out of Albanian-controlled municipalities." The Congress' campaign "increased fears of renewed ethnic violence" in the country. At the same time, Albanian leaders maintained that "if the referendum succeeded it would undermine the guiding principle of the Ohrid Accords, namely that Macedonia's ethnic majority should not be allowed to impose laws on minorities without their consent." 82 A few days prior to the vote on the referendum the United States agreed to 80 Wood, "Boundary Changes." 81 Wood, "Boundary Changes"; the redrawing of boundaries would also make Albanians the majority in 16 of 80 new municipalities, adding to the 28 of 124 that they already dominated. ibid.; The Slavs in Struga had rioted in July a week after the laws for redrawing municipal boundaries and giving more power to city councils were passed by the parliament. Nicholas Wood said, "It was the first major outbreak of civil unrest since the end of an internecine conflict in the country three years ago." Nicholas Wood, "Ethnic Macedonians Riot Over New Laws That Aid Albanians," New York Times (24 July 2004). 82 Wood, "Boundary Changes"; only one percent more would live in municipalities where they were a minority. Wood called the belief that the changes constituted "ethnic cleansing" a "colossal exaggeration." ibid.; The European program director of the International Crisis Group said fears that the new law would "lead to larger numbers of Macedonians being dominated by Albanian councils…unfounded." Wood, "Boundary Changes"; In response to the World Macedonian Congress' action, the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD) called for a boycott of the referendum and its spokesman predicted that if it were passed, it would bring about the country's demise. Without elaborating, he also said that his party "would consider supporting a possible referendum on the Albanian minority's political autonomy." "Macedonian Albanian Party Predicts 'End of Macedonia,'" Radio Free Europe (25 August 2004). recognize the country as the "Republic of Macedonia," apparently to relieve tensions. 83 The Macedonia, much of the autonomy and integration promised under the Ohrid accord had yet to be realized. Many said that the ethnic Macedonian-dominated government never recognized the need for increased language rights and autonomy for minority communities and complained that it formally respected the Ohrid process without showing the political will to implement it effectively. 86 An international human rights law professor at the South East European University in Tetovo claimed that the government was only "pretending" that it had been "trying to integrate minority groups" over the previous decade. 93 the country's identity will be dominated by the majority Slavic community or whether it will be a multi-ethnic one that incorporates all of the communities, including the Albanians, Turks, Gypsies, and Vlachs. Still to be determined is how that will end. In the meantime, demographics, especially in the Albanian and Slavic communities, continue to change, thereby altering the balance between them. The challenge of reaching some kind of accord between them remains immense.
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